Against recent attempts to argue that generic distinctions between history and other forms are not particularly relevant to analysis of how the divine is represented, this paper argues that generic distinctions are important from Herodotus on. History has its own distinctive discursive practices, however inventively historians work on the margins with other genres such as epic and tragedy.
5 autonomy-in the particular sense of "autonomy" so productively introduced into our discussion at the conference by Renate Schlesier. 11 "Autonomous" in this sense does not mean "entirely in a realm of its own", for it is impossible to know what such an autonomous discourse would look like-a radically autonomous discourse would be incomprehensible. If literature did not have a certain kind of autonomy, however, it would be simply tautologous, for its functions would be served by some other discourse. And literature does have functions which are not symmetrical with or reducible to the functions of other discourses, as has been well argued by Lamarque and Olsen: "Literature is not merely a response to already defined existential problems, nor an expression of already felt and accepted moral and social values.
It is one of the ways in which these existential problems, as well as social and moral values, are defined and developed for us." 12 From this perspective the polarisations between formalism and historicism look more and more suspect, since it is precisely the historically based formal features of texts which make it possible for them to perform within a society the kind of work identified by Lamarque and Olsen. As Glenn Most puts it: "Linguistics, anthropology, and social theory can cast helpful light on genre conceived not as a recipe from handbooks of poetics but rather as a social phenomenon. Genre is the langue that makes possible any literary parole."
13
Paying serious attention to genre in this larger sense, then, is indispensable if we are to do justice to the texts and to the religious, ideological, and cultural work they are doing. In this paper, my test case will be the representation of mythic material and of divine action in Roman historiography, and I shall argue that we must pay attention to the distinctions which ancient historians drew between their procedures for representing myth or divinity and those 6 of other writers, particularly poets. Here I shall be debating with a recent paper by Peter
Wiseman, in which he argues that in first century BC Rome "for many readers the distinction between the proper pursuits of poets and historians was far from clear-cut, and certainly not a simple matter of literary genre". 14 As my argument so far has shown, I do not regard "literary genre" as a "simple matter", and it is worth revisiting the question of what was at stake for historians in their engagements with other religious discourses.
Before coming to the texts of the first century BC which are my prime focus, we must begin with Herodotus, the father of the genre, who initiated procedures for the new discourse which had fundamental consequences. 15 One of Herodotus' first moves was to introduce a distinction between-to put it bluntly-history and myth, in terms of subject matter, and between history and epic, in terms of narrative mode. These two categories-of form and content, very roughly-are of course intermingled with each other, and we shall revisit the question of their inextricability. But from the opening pages of Herodotus' history the crucial demarcations are there, between history and epic and between what is going to count as myth or history. The demarcations are grounded in a claim to a new kind of knowledge, and in a foreswearing of the kind of knowledge which epic poetry claimed. 16 The opening of Herodotus' history is playing off a Homeric conception of the deep past as one inaccessible to normal human knowledge, a conception most crisply formulated by Homer when he invokes the Muses in Iliad 2.484-6. Here Homer says that the Muses do have knowledge ( ‡στε) about this heroic past, whereas we hear only report (κλ°ος ο‰ον éκοÊοµεν), and do not know anything (οÈδ° τι ‡δµεν). Much of the force of this Homeric passage comes from the fact that 7 the Greek word to "know" is cognate with the word to "see", while the word κλ°ος, "report", is cognate with the word to "hear". This is an antithesis of wide importance in Homer, one referred to by characters as well: seeing something and knowing it for yourself is incomparably superior to merely hearing about it from another source. 17 When Herodotus rejects the Persian version of Io and turns to Croesus, he is playing on precisely this Homeric antithesis, for he uses Homer's verb of knowledge, but positively (1.5.3). "We do not know anything", Homer had said; "I know myself" (ο‰δα αÈτÒς), says Herodotus, without a negative, of his own sure knowledge, not of his ignorance. Homer cannot know for himself about the distant past, and has to rely on the Muses to tell him; Herodotus cannot know for himself about the distant past either, and so he will tell about the things that he can know, and know for himself-αÈτÒς. In the case of Herodotus we can see that his strategies in this sphere are part of a larger strategy for creating a new kind of authorial persona. This persona has many strong affinities with the new personae being moulded by his contemporaries in medicine and science, and much of what Geoffrey Lloyd has taught us about the new rhetorical strategies designed in those new discourses could be copied over directly for Herodotus' history. 21 Lloyd highlights the importance to the new scientific discourses of "the habit of scrutiny, and…the expectation of justification-of giving an account-and the premium set on rational methods of doing so"; 22 he likewise picks out "the prominence of the authorial ego, the prizing of innovation both theoretical and practical, the possibility of engaging in explicit criticism of earlier authorities, even in the wholesale rejection (at times) of custom and tradition…". The kind of distinction we see at work in Herodotus is widely observed in both the Greek and Roman worlds. 28 It is very similar to what Parker, discussing fifth and fourth century Athens, calls the contrast between "the theological opacity of oratory and the transparency of tragedy". 29 As he puts it: "Oratory never invites the listeners to believe that they can gaze at
Olympus and penetrate the counsels of the gods. The claims it makes about divine motivation are almost invariably vague and general; they concern 'the gods', not named individuals, and it would have been inconceivable for an orator to pretend, for instance, to describe a clash of will between Poseidon and Athena. (μίμησιν…θείων καὶ ἀνθρωπεών). 34 History, for all the interest which it can display in the inherited body of myth and in religious concerns, does not have both "divine and human characters", nor does it have "characterful representation of things divine as well as human", with gods part of the mimesis like humans.
These general issues have to be borne in mind when we are considering historical texts from the Roman period as well. The later historical tradition, including the Roman one, is remarkably faithful to Herodotus' pioneering prescriptions in the field of representing the divine: "from Herodotus on, the historians…refrained from following Homer into the narration of divine action on its own plane. Even epiphanies in historians are, after all, accounts of human experience. An ancient historian will describe a report of a deity appearing in battle, for example, but he will not narrate the decision of the deity to appear, or transcribe the god's conversation before he sets off for the battle-site." 35 Similarly, the later historians' approach to the inclusion or exclusion of mythic or miraculous material retains recognisably Herodotean features, although there was certainly more variety of treatment here, as we shall see. 36 Because the origin of this historiographical trope of demarcation from myth was not a technological or methodological advance but a new kind of rhetoric, the distinctions claimed between history and myth could vary considerably. Historians could use chronology, for example, to delimit their subject matter from "the times of myth", as
Dionysius of Halicarnassus calls them, when he says that the Assyrian Empire reaches back εἰς τοὺς μυθικοὺς χρόνους (Ant. Rom. 1.2.2). The Trojan war was regularly the chosen cutoff point; 37 but for Ephorus, writing a panhellenic history in the middle of the fourth century, the demarcation line was the return of the Heracleidae, 80 years after the Trojan war. Ephorus deliberately proclaims that he will not begin with the events of myth; 38 in a very Thucydidean passage he says that you cannot give an accurate account of ancient events, as opposed to contemporary ones, since deeds and speeches of the distant past cannot be remembered through such a long time. 39 One of the fullest discussions of this topic comes in Plutarch's
Preface to the paired Lives of Theseus and Romulus, which has recently been the subject of a fine analysis by Pelling: in working on Theseus, Plutarch says, he has gone through that time "which can be reached by reasonable inference or where factual history can find a firm foothold", and has now reached a point where he might "say of those remoter ages, 'All that lies beyond are fables and tragic stories…'". 40 Inevitably, these are broad generalisations about a very long, varied and contentious tradition, one including historians who narrated the exploits of Dionysus in India or Heracles in the West as prototypes of later Hellenic arrivals, or who invented charter myths for Greek colonies. 41 The case of Roman history is particularly challenging because it shares the characteristics both of a universal history and also of a local history, which had to account for origin stories of all kinds, including the fabulous: a narrative of the history of Rome from the origins will start off as a local history but end up as a universal history. 42 Still, Marincola is fundamentally correct to say that the historians ended up with three options when dealing with myth: leave it out, rationalise it, or report it noncommittally, leaving judgement up to the reader. 43 Of the first option, Ephorus may stand as a paradigm; of the second, Dionysius of Halicarnassus; of the third, Diodorus Siculus, with his careful sequestration of six books of pre-Trojan War mythic material in a self-contained achronological bracket of their own (1.5.1).
The moments when historians confront the problem of myth can provide some of their most interesting moments of self-definition, as they manoeuvre on the boundaries of poetry, drama or philosophy in order to define their projects in the same way that epic or elegiac poets manoeuvre on their inter-generic boundaries in order to define their projects. 44 We observe an analogous technique already in Herodotus, as Susanne Gödde shows in her paper in this volume, referring to the passage in Book 2 where Herodotus pulls himself up short before he transgresses his self-imposed ban on talking about "divine things" ("which I particularly shun narrating", τὰ ἐγὼ φεύγω μάλιστα ἀπηγέεσθαι, 2.65.2). Livy's Preface is a famous case in point, for it engages throughout with the opposing modes of poetry, most spectacularly at the end, with his wish that he could begin his work, as poets do, with prayers and supplications to the gods and goddesses (praef. 13). As Woodman points out, this is "a device which he explicitly borrows from poetry but which serves only to underline the difference between two genres". 45 Earlier in the Preface Livy brushes against history's limits, exploiting the trope of chronological demarcation between history and myth in the process, when he acknowledges that much of the tradition concerning the foundation of the city is "more appropriate to the myths of poetry than to uncorrupted monuments of achievements" (poeticis magis decora fabulis quam incorruptis rerum gestarum monumentis, praef. 6). Here he is following
Herodotus and Thucydides in setting up a strategy of skirmishing with opposing genres which will carry on strongly into the first book. 'This indulgence is granted to antiquity that it makes the first stages of cities more august by mixing the human and divine. 47 And if it ought to be allowed to any people to hallow their origins and make the gods responsible for them, then the glory in war of the Roman people is such that when they say that Mars himself was their father and the father of their founder, the peoples of the earth should put up with this with as much equanimity as they put up with the empire.'
Here he is not saying, as Moles claims, that "it remains a plus if a historical work can include the mingling of human and divine". 48 Livy will report the myth of Romulus' divine parentage because it is in the tradition and has immense consequences, but he is not obliged to vouch for it: this is part of his general policy, carried on from Herodotus' example, of narrating miraculous or supernatural material with distancing formulae of report such as dicitur. 49 He acknowledges the power of these myths in bolstering Roman power, just as he understands that the way the peoples of the empire have to acquiesce in the ideology is independent of the truth of the stories. 50 He knows that these myths are indispensable to the auctoritas of the Roman empire, but he also knows that vouching for them in his own right would undermine his own auctoritas: the acceptance of the myths is incumbent upon an indulgent Roman posterity and a compliant group of subjects, and Livy does not wish to identify himself with either category. It matters crucially to him, then, to maintain the differences between his genre and those in which such myths are at home. Otherwise he will not be able to sustain the persona necessary to enforce the practical utility that he hopes will come from his history's didactic and moral power, which he expounds in the following sections (9-10), directly addressing the reader as his fellow-citizen (te…tibi tuaeque reipublicae). 51 If his history fails to demonstrate in a plausible way what the "life, customs, and men" were like in the past (quae uita, qui mores..., per quos uiros, 9), then it will have failed in this objective. His demarcation between the old stories and his own educative project is part of his whole strategy at the beginning of the work.
In his actual narration of the fables surrounding the foundation of the city Livy manages to have his cake and eat it too. He is extremely careful to refrain from endorsing the tradition, 'But, so I think, fate made inevitable the origin of such a great city and the beginning of an empire that is the greatest after the power of the gods. When the raped Vestal had given birth to twins, either because she thought so, or else because a god was a more honourable source to put the blame on, she named Mars as the father of the doubtful children.'
After the birth of the twins, an artful word arrangement makes it look for a moment as if we are going to be offered alternative rationalising and supernatural explanations. 52 seu ita rata seu quia deus…"Either because she thought so, or else because a god"-here a supplement such as "really was responsible" is taken away from us, as we go on to read "was a more honourable source to put the blame on" (auctor culpae honestior erat). Either way, it is only what the priestess said.
The story of the foundation of the Ara Maxima is a related example of this kind of technique.
In the Preface Livy said that he would not vouch for mythical events before the foundation of the city, yet early on in Book 1 he does give us a famous aetiological tale from fable, involving the demi-god Hercules, from the time before the foundation, even before the fall of Troy. He artfully inserts it as a flashback in the Romulus narrative, so that it is made into a subset of history. When he comes to discuss Romulus' religious practices, he tells us that
Romulus performed sacrifices to the other gods according to the Alban rite, but to Hercules according to the Greek rite, following the way the sacrifices had been established by Evander apotheosis and the cult of the Ara Maxima, to be tended by the nation that will in the future be the most powerful on earth (1.7.10). 53 Two considerations in particular, both aetiological in nature, make it important for Livy to bend his generic capacities in order to include this story.
Livy is very interested in aetiology and its contemporary uses, particularly in these early sections of his work, and here he contrives to deliver two telling aetiological messages through the medium of the myth without in the end compromising the overall status of his narrative or his persona. First, he wishes to stress that Greek and Roman culture were intermingled from the start, and he uses the case study of the Graecus ritus in cult: even before the city was founded, according to this tale, the cult of the site of Rome involved Greek cult. 54 Second, Livy tangentially suggests at the end of the digression that Romulus' fostering of the cult of Hercules already anticipates the way that Augustus himself would be behaving centuries later, in Livy's own day. The cult of Hercules, says Livy, was the only foreign cult adopted by Romulus, who was 'even then a supporter of the immortality achieved by virtue to which his own destiny was leading him' (iam tum immortalitatis uirtute partae ad quam eum sua fata ducebant fautor, 1.7.15). In all kinds of ways Romulus is a prototype of Augustus, and one of the resemblances between the two is precisely this care over the cult of deified heroes as a template for their own eventual apotheosis. 55 The kind of pressure that Augustus is putting on the boundaries of contemporary Roman religious practice finds an echo in the pressure Livy puts here on the norms of his narrative.
Passages such as that in Livy's Preface have recently been reinterpreted by Peter Wiseman in a very different way, as a "partisan statement of philosophical scepticism": Wiseman sees
Livy as being in a minority, and he argues for recovering a historiographical tradition that accepted "miracle stories and divine epiphanies as a proper part of their subject matter", arguing that the "issue was not one of literary convention but of theological belief". 56 "Even in the sophisticated Rome of the first century B.C.," he concludes, "for many readers the distinction between the proper pursuits of poets and historians was far from clear-cut, and certainly not a simple matter of literary genre." 57 Wiseman certainly presents a rich world of inherited stories about divine interventions and miraculous events, and this world is one with which any student of the period must become familiar; further, he makes an important case for the anomalous position of one historian (although it is not, I think, Livy). Yet the question of genre remains crucial, for the intellectual environment of the first century B.C. was one where different discourses were self-consciously competing with each other in pursuing different objectives and addressing different, though overlapping, audiences. The debates recovered by
Wiseman over credulity and scepticism, rather than making generic analysis redundant, were precisely made possible by creative work with generic expectations: no expression of 20 "theological belief" was possible outside the context of a "literary convention", so that these apparently polarised terms are mutually defining, not mutually exclusive.
In regarding "literary genre" as a "simple matter", Wiseman can cloud the issues by not taking the discursive differences seriously enough. He adduces evidence from a range of different kinds of texts as if they all worked in the same way, and he can overlook fundamental narratological questions such as "Qui parle?" in rather the same way as scholars regularly do Maximus' Facta ac dicta memorabilia was, and however indebted it may have been to historical and especially Livian sources, it was not a work of formal history in the tradition of Herodotus. 59 "Valerius was writing moral protreptic," comments Wiseman, "not philosophical argument." 60 And not history either. 61 Just as for the Atthidographers, who "did not accept a firm boundary between mythical and historical material, and passed within their works from one to the other", 62 so too for Varro, the material for the antiquarian was the inherited mass of tradition about the city, which it was the job of the scholar to organise and transmit. Valerius similarly sees it as his function to 'repeat what is in the tradition' (tradita repetuntur, 1.8.7). These projects have their own merits and their own roles to play within the debate over the past and the divine in the period, but they are not the same merits and roles as those of formal history, with its political and utilitarian programmes. 63 It is somewhat misleading to group such disparate authors together as "other historians" to point a contrast with Livy, as Wiseman does in his concluding paragraph: "For Livy, divine intervention was not appropriate to 'uncorrupted' history-but we know that other historians thought it was." 64 Someone who does qualify as "another historian", and who approaches these questions in a manner significantly different from Livy, is Dionysius of Halicarnassus. Wiseman's discussion is highly instructive, showing how Dionysius repeatedly narrates myths at length and foregrounds issues of how to interpret them. 65 Dionysius is to some extent drawn into this realm by the whole theme of his work: to vindicate the Greek nature of the Romans and to justify their hegemony to the Greek world, he needs to go far back into mythical time in order to reach the point of divergence between Roman and Greek, thus involving himself constantly in adjudicating the merits of the stories in the early mythical tradition. 66 In this way he bears out the point we remarked on above, that a history of Roman origins will be more involved in Dionysius' use of these techniques differs at times, however, in that it can be coupled with reflections on the material which directly qualify the distancing in interesting ways. One of the most remarkable stories narrated by Dionysius exhibits this complex technique, and may stand as an example of how subtle Dionysius' procedures can be, and how fine can be the distinctions between his techniques and those of his Roman counterpart, Livy.
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The story is a famous one, related in many other sources, 72 and it concerns the founding of Alba Longa by Aeneas' son, Ascanius. Dionysius introduces the story by saying that during the foundation 'a very big marvel is said to have occurred' (θαῦμα μέγιστον λέγεται γενέσθαι, 1.67.1), and the narrative proceeds in oratio obliqua (1.67.1-4). The Penates brought by Aeneas from Troy and settled in his city of Lavinium now need to be moved to the new city, yet the night after they are transported to Alba Longa they miraculously move back to Lavinium. Once more the images are brought back to Alba Longa, and once more they migrate back to Lavinium. At this point the people leave the Penates where they are, in Lavinium, and send six hundred of the men from the new city back to Lavinium to take care of them there. Embedded in this myth we may detect some of the main concerns of the Roman myth of Trojan origins, even though Dionysius' eventual elaboration will move the focus somewhat. The Romans want a link back to Troy, but they do not want it to be too direct: in the developed version of the foundation myth, Aeneas does not simply found Rome, but founds Lavinium, and then from Lavinium is founded Alba Longa, and from Alba Longa is founded Rome. Even this chain of connection feels too strong, it seems, with the result that Alba is obliterated, so that the link in the chain is removed. The Penates cannot be destroyed along with Alba, so they have to stay in Lavinium, after being temporarily housed in Alba. 73 The story of the miraculously migrating Penates is partly meant to "explain" how the Penates come to be still in Lavinium, but it is really there to help focus on the opposing poles of transience and stability that are so important to the foundation myths: the Penates have to stop moving eventually, and they have to stop before they come to be rooted in Rome itself. The
Trojan connection, then, is one that is mediated through the Latins to Rome, not directly from After reporting what Timaeus said about the images in Lavinium (1.67.4), he uses language of scrupulous piety to declare that 'in the case of those things which it is not lawful for all to see I ought neither to hear about them from those who do see them nor to describe them'; he then goes on to introduce his account of the images in Rome by describing them as 'the things 25 which I myself know by having seen and concerning which no scruple forbids me to write '. 77 This is the self-policing pious language one sees in Pindar, for example, or especially in Herodotus, where language of piety is mingled into language of generic appropriateness. 78 The authority of the author is multiply overdetermined, as someone who knows how to speak right about such things on many grounds. It is not a register one encounters in historians within the Latin tradition.
Similarly, Dionysius is far more engaged than the Latin historians in explicit discussion of the philosophical issues involved in adjudicating whether and how the gods intervene in human affairs. 79 His readiness to engage in such discussions once again marks him off from his counterparts in Latin historiography, as does his directly related interest in using the traditional myths to endorse religious piety. His self-consciousness about his "Kreuzung der
Gattungen" in this sphere is very clear, for he regularly breaks off his quasi-philosophical discussions with remarks such as 'this is not an opportune moment to consider the question'
(οὔτε καιρὸς ἐν τῷ παρόντι διασκοπεῖν, 1.77.3). 80 His willingness to conduct such debates by no means necessarily entails endorsing the myths. As we saw in the case of Herodotus, there is no necessary contradiction between religious perspectives or expressions of piety and a reluctance to endorse the matter of myth; indeed, as is shown by Dionysius' famous discussion of the absence in Rome of Greek-style myths about divine misdeeds (2.19.1-2), certain kinds of myth positively demanded disbelief from the pious. Rather than Livy, then, as argued by Wiseman, Dionysius looks more like the odd man out in terms of representing the divine in historiography. The two historians' practices share many distinctive features, as inherited ultimately from Herodotus, but the main explanation for the differences between them is to be sought in their different relationships to the Roman state.
As a citizen addressing fellow citizens and narrating to them the past operations of the Senate and people of Rome, Livy is operating from within the web of Roman religious practices.
Dionysius is a resident outsider who is addressing fellow Greeks. Livy's representation of things divine is focalised through the Roman state, whereas Dionysius' is focalised through the eyes of an individual from outside the system. Livy has a well developed interest in divine manifestations and the possible patterns of fate, but Livy's "perspective is that of the human unfolding of events: the intervention of the gods is no less documented here than it is in other genres and works, such as Virgil's epic. But it is represented from the point of view of the City's interests rather than any individual's, and by deduction rather than explicit identification." 83 Dionysius' perspective is not the same; he is a latter-day Herodotus rather than a native, giving reports to his peers of foreign traditions and endeavouring to make sense of those traditions with the resources available to him from within his own culture.
In fragmentary authors, such as the Latin annalists, we are almost always reliant on testimonia and indirect citation, and without a full text it is naturally very dangerous to judge how they told such stories as the migration of the Penates from Alba Longa to Lavinium. 84 approach to the distinction between myth and history, especially in his Herodotean declarations that he sets no store by how stories of this kind will be judged (ea nec adfirmare nec refellere in animo est §6; haud in magno equidem ponam discrimine, §8). 47 As Tony Woodman points out to me, the first quoted sentence has a focus on the present that is regularly overlooked: as he puts it, datur haec uenia antiquitati etc. means (a) "we concede it to the ancients that they mingle human and divine and thereby make the origins of cities more august" and (b) "we concede to <the notion of> antiquity that, by mingling human and divine, we make the origins…" 
